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ii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of Appellant's appeal of the trial court's judgment 
pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court acted within its authority in rejecting elements of the 
parties' settlement agreement and rejecting others in the context of a custodial dispute. 
Standard of Review: This court reviews a trial court's custody and parent time 
decisions for abuse of discretion. Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). 
STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
In attacking the trial court's authority to accept or reject stipulated settlement 
agreements, in whole or in part, this appeal directly implicates the trial court's authority 
under Utah Code section 30-3-5 (2008). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
After a long relationship with Appellee, Appellant Roger Bryner filed a petition for 
divorce on July 16, 2004. (R. 1-6.) Appellee Svetlana Bryner filed her answer on August 
14, 2004, in which she informed the trial court that the parties had never been married, 
but rather had merely cohabitated for an extended period, resulting in the birth of two 
children. (R. 66-70.) Thus, the particular issues before the court centered on the parties' 
competing claims for custody, parent-time, and child support. (R. 66-70.) The parties 
then engaged in a long and contentious litigation, which lasted for over four years and 
resulted in a record of over 11,000 pages, requiring an index of ninety-four pages. The 
1 
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parties engaged in a mediated effort to enter into a stipulated settlement on November 10, 
2005, which resulted in a broad agreement, but the terms were not reduced to writing at 
that time. (R. 3787.) Negotiations continued and eventually, although the parties were 
unable to agree on the terms of a comprehensive stipulated settlement, the parties each 
submitted competing motions to enforce the settlement agreement. (R. 2257-2270; 2603-
2636.) 
On February 28, 2006, the trial court held a hearing in an effort to resolve the 
parties' issues concerning the terms of the stipulated settlement. (R. 3945: 1-263.) 
During this hearing, the court resolved many of the parties' differences without objection. 
(R. 3945: 1-263.) On May 8, 2006, the trial court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Judgment on Cross-Motions to Enforce Settlement Agreement, which Mr. 
Bryner now appeals. (R. 3787-3801.) Neither party thereafter moved to amend the 
court's decision or to have it set-aside, and Appellant has identified no evidence in the 
record that either party ever filed a written or oral objection to the court's decision. 
The trial court issued a final judgment on the remaining issues on May 8, 2008. 
Mr. Bryner now appeals. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
After the parties" relationship ended in 2004, the parties engaged in a protracted, 
unpleasant, and contentious litigation over the custody, support, and parent-time of their 
children. The trial court assumed jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to the general 
authority granted it under Utah Code section 30-3-5 (2008). In an effort to expedite the 
resolution of this dispute, the court encouraged the parties to mediate, which they did, 
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coming to an agreement on most issues. However, the parties failed to reduce the 
agreement to writing, and negotiations continued thereafter. (R. 3787.) Both parties then, 
convinced that their individual recollection of the agreement represented the actual agreed 
upon terms, asked the trial court to enforce their respective versions. The court held a 
hearing on the issue, providing both parties ample opportunity to speak, and rendered a 
decision through which the court enforced several agreed upon terms and altered certain 
others to protect the best interests of the parties and their children. (R. 3787-3801; 3945). 
Although Mr. Bryner now seeks to unravel the entire agreement, his effort fails to 
satisfy the requirements of Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. First, 
under Rule 24, an appellant is required to have preserved the issue that they seek to 
appeal, and to point where in the record that preservation occurred. Mr. Bryner has failed 
on both elements. Mr. Bryner points the court to his Hearing Brief as evidence of his 
preservation. However, Mr. Bryner misapprehends the nature of his appeal. In essence, 
Mr. Bryner has challenged the authority of the trial court overseeing a custody dispute to 
accept or reject terms of the parties' stipulated settlement agreement. His hearing brief 
contains no argument on this issue. Rather, Mr. Bryner Hearing Brief appears to support 
the trial court authority, in that Mr. Bryner himself argues that the trial court should not, 
and indeed cannot, allow the parties to insert an arbitrator between the court and decisions 
involving the children. Further, Appellee's review of the record reveals a striking 
absence of any challenge to the trial court's May 8, 2006 decision. No motions to set-
aside the order, or to alter or amend the order, were ever filed; nor does the record reflect 
that either party ever filed a written or oral objection to the order. As a result, Mr. Bryner 
3 
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has failed to preserve the issue that he seeks to appeal, and this court should thus 
summarily dispose of his appeal. 
Further, under Rule 24, an appellant is required to cite this Court to authority 
relevant to the issue that actually has been presented to the court and to apply that 
authority in a meaningful and analytical fashion. Mr. Bryner has failed to meet this 
requirement. Instead, Mr. Bryner presents this court with a single citation to foreign 
authority involving a commercial contract between legal strangers, and the effort of one 
of those parties to have the terms of that contract enforced in the absence of a writing 
reflecting the parties' agreement. See Banks v. Mitsubishi Motors Credit of America, 435 
F.3d 538 (5 Cir. 2005). In contrast, the instant appeal centers on Mr. Bryner's efforts to 
overturn the trial court's decision to reject certain portions of the parties' stipulated 
settlement agreement entered into in an effort to resolve this case. There was no contract, 
the parties are not legal strangers, and in the context of a custody dispute, the trial court is 
the final arbiter of settlement terms that will be accepted by the court. In the absence of 
any authority discussing the trial court's authority to accept or reject, in whole or in part, 
the stipulated settlement agreements entered into by parties involved in custodial disputes, 
Mr. Bryner has failed to present this Court with any relevant authority. This court should 
therefore summarily dismiss his appeal. 
Third, although Mr. Bryner appears to argue that the trial court committed legal 
error in rejecting or modifying certain terms of the parties stipulated settlement 
agreement, he has failed to describe the harm or prejudice caused by this alleged error. 
Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure clearly articulates that in the absence of any 
4 
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allegation of harm or prejudice, any error committed by the trial court is by definition 
harmless error, not subject to review or reversal. Mr. Bryner merely assets that the trial 
court erred, not that he was harmed. In the absence of prejudice to Mr. Bryner, even 
assuming that the trial court erred, this court has no choice but to summarily affirm the 
trial court's decision and reject Mr. Bryner's appeal. 
Finally, long-standing Utah authority supports the trial court's decision. In the context of 
decisions necessary to resolve issues presented in divorce and custody actions, there is no 
question that the law supports parties entering into stipulated settlement agreements. However, 
there is equally no question that such stipulated settlement agreements are not binding upon the 
trial court, but are instead advisory. Should the trial court conclude that certain terms are unfair, 
unreasonable, or against Utah public policy, the trial court has the authority, if not the obligation, 
to reject or alter the offending term. Here, after evaluating the parties' competing versions of the 
stipulated settlement agreement, and after holding a seven to eight-hour hearing on the issue, the 
court concluded that certain provisions were either unfair or in violation of public policy. Thus, 
the trial court declined to adopt these terms as orders of the court. Most specifically, the court 
refused to adopt any term that would have removed decisions involving custody, parent-time, or 
support from the court into the hands of an arbitrator. In doing so, the trial court was simply 
exercising the discretion and authority granted to it, and mandated for it, by the Utah Legislature. 
As a result, Mr. Bryner's appeal is without merit, and this court should summarily affirm the trial 




I. APPELLANT'S BRIEF DOES NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF 
RULE 24 OF THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
Mr. Bryner's brief fails to comport with the requirements of Rule 24 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, and therefore his appeal should be rejected. "Rule 24 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure contains unambiguous requirements for a briefs 
organization and contents," which are designed to decrease the cost of litigation and to 
minimize the '"burdens [placed upon] the judiciary's time and energy.'" State v. Green, 
2004 UT 76, If 11, 99 P.3d 820 (quoting Beehive Tel Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm % 2004 UT 
18, Tf 12, 89 P.3d 131 (additional citations omitted)). Citation to the record, citation to 
relevant authority with pin-cite precision and application, and some demonstration 
sufficient to meet this Court's preservation requirements all fall under the ambit of Rule 
24's requirements. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) (stating that 
it is impermissible for a party to shift the burden of research and argument to the 
reviewing court); see also Green, 2004 UT 76, f^ 11. In the instant case, although Mr. 
Bryner's brief fails to satisfy most, if not, of Rule 24's requirements, Mr. Bryner's failure 
to preserve the argument that he presents on appeal, as well as the absence of any citation 
to, or application of, authority relevant to this matter should be fatal to his appeal. 
A. Mr. Bryner Failed to Preserve his Argument 
Although it is difficult to discern the scope of Mr. Bryner's appellate argument, he 
appears to be attacking the court's authority to adopt some, but not all of the terms of the 
parties' stipulated agreement. "In order to preserve an issue for appeal[,] the issue must 
6 
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be presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule 
on that issue." Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48,1j 14, 48 P.3d 
968. "For a trial court to be afforded an opportunity to correct the error '(1) the issue 
must be raised in a timely fashion[,] (2) the issue must be specifically raised[,] and (3) the 
challenging party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority.5" 438 
Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, If 51, 99 P.3d 801 (quoting Brookside, 2002 
UT 48, Tf 14. Failure to preserve an issue properly results in its waiver as an issue on 
appeal. See id. 
Here, Mr. Bryner asserts that he preserved the issues asserted on appeal "As stated 
in Petitioner's 'Brief for February 28 Hearing' filed with the court on February 17 2006 
and heard on February 28, 2006." Appellant's Brief, p.5. However, Mr. Bryner fails to 
support this contention with a record cite, which, given the 11,787 pages indexed thus far 
in the record, is a glaring failure on his part. Further, the document upon which Mr. 
Bryner bases his preservation claim does not, in fact, support his claim. Nowhere in this 
document does Mr. Bryner present the trial court with a specific argument that the trial 
court lacked the authority to adopt certain provisions of the parties' settlement agreement 
and reject others. (R. 2729-2732.) Mr. Bryner also failed to present the trial court with 
any authority that would have supported such an argument, instead concentrating his 
analysis and attention on his interpretation of contract law, and, interestingly, his assertion 
that any effort to restrict the parties to arbitration on issues of child custody, parent-time, 
SLC 343493.1 
7 
and child support would be void as violative of public policy. (R. 2732.) Consequently, 
Mr. Bryner failed to preserve the actual issue that he now seeks to appeal.1 
B. Mr. Bryner Failed to Cite and Apply Authority Relevant to his Actual 
Argument 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a), "an appellant's brief'shall contain the contentions and 
reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented . . . with citation to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.' 'Implicitly, rule 24(a)(9) requires 
not just bald citation to authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis 
based upon that authority.'" State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, \ 13, 99 P.3d 820 (quoting Utah 
R. App. P. 24(a) & State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998)). The Utah Courts of 
Appeal are not "a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of 
argument and research." State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, f^ 6, 1 P.3d 1108 (quotations and 
citations omitted). And in the absence of any meaningful effort to satisfy these rules, 
w
"[i]t is well established that a reviewing court will not address arguments that are not 
adequately briefed.'" Green, 2004 UT 76, If 15 (quoting Thomas, 961 P.2d at 304). 
Here, Mr. Bryner appears to assert that the trial court erred in refusing to adopt all 
of the settlement terms that the parties presented to the court as describing their settlement 
agreement. In an effort to support his argument, Mr. Bryner cites just one authority: 
1
 It also appears that to the extent that Mr. Bryner's appeal centers on the trial court's refusal to 
extend the parties' agreement to arbitrate to issues involving custody, support, and parent time, 
Mr. Bryner invited the court to make that decision. Therefore, to the extent that the trial court 
erred, Mr. Bryner invited that error and is precluded from seeking relief from that decision on 
appeal. See Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41,117 n. 17, 164 P.3d 366. 
2
 Mr. Bryner failed to provide the Court with the required Statement of the Issues and the 
applicable standard of review in violation of Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(5), leaving 
the Court and Appellee to identify the issue through an evaluation of the argument contained in 
8 
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Banks v. Mitsubishi Motors Credit of America, 435 F.3d 538 (5 Cir. 2005). However, 
Banks has no application here. In Banks, the court was faced with determining whether, 
under Mississippi law, a commercial contract could exist in the absence of an actual 
writing. See id. The thrust of the appeal involved the appellant's effort to compel 
arbitration pursuant to a mandatory arbitration provision that it argued was included in the 
contract. See id. The court held that under Mississippi law, the existence and terms of a 
contract, including an arbitration clause, could be proved by parol evidence under the 
proper circumstances. See id. 
Mr. Bryner's reliance on Banks is more than simply misplaced; it is entirely 
inapplicable. The issue before this Court bears no resemblance to the issues presented in 
Banks, and Mr. Bryner's suggestion that Banks offers any relevant insight is simply 
inaccurate. The dispute in the instant case arose from the parties' custody dispute, and 
Mr. Bryner has asked, in essence, this Court to limit or eliminate the trial court's authority 
to adopt or reject settlement terms in that context. By presenting Banks as his sole 
support for his argument, Mr. Bryner argument is "devoid of authority to explain the legal 
basis for the desired outcome." Green, 2004 UT 76, ^ 14. Thus, Mr. Bryner has 
presented this court with no relevant authority on the issue properly before the court, 
resulting in a failure to develop an argument based on relevant authority in the manner 
his appellate brief. Further, as Mr. Bryner concedes on appeal, and as the trial court recognized, 
the parties failed to memorialize the terms of the stipulated settlement agreement, which resulted 
in the parties presenting the court with competing settlement agreements, which agreed in some 
aspects and disagreed in others. As a result, the trial court was required to determine the exact 
nature of the parties' agreement, and then to evaluate whether it would adopt all of the agreed 
upon terms, or abandon certain of the settlement terms to protect the parties and the best interests 
of the children. 
9 
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required under Rule 24. In essence, Mr. Bryner has done nothing more than dump the 
burden of research and argument on this Court and upon Appellee. Consequently, this 
Court should decline Mr. Bryner's invitation to review the trial court's decision and reject 
his appeal. See Huish v. Munro, 2008 UT App 283, \ 11, 191 P.3d 1242 (holding "it is 
not our burden to research the record and the law to determine whether some violation 
might have occurred and, if so, whether it was of any consequence"). 
II. MR. BRYNER HAS FAILED TO ARTICULATE ANY HARM RESULTING 
FROM THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION 
Assuming that Mr. Bryner's position has any merit, he has failed to articulate any 
harm or prejudice caused to him by the alleged error, and in the absence of such harm, his 
argument must fail. "Unless an appellant demonstrates that an error is prejudicial, it will 
be deemed harmless and no appellate relief is available." Huish, 2008 UT App 283, ^ f 8 
(citations omitted); see also Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354, 359 n.10 (Utah 1975) 
("Under both Rules of Procedure and Decisional law, we do not reverse for mere error, 
but only if error is substantial and prejudicial."); Utah R. Civ. P. 61 (stating "no error or 
defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the 
parties, is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, 
unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial 
justice"). 
In the instant case, Mr. Bryner argues that the trial court erred in limiting the 
application of the parties' agreement to arbitrate and removing all child related issues 
from the reach of arbitration. However, he articulates no harm to him resulting from this 
decision. Rather, he asserts, incorrectly, that the decision may offend the thrust of the 
10 
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Utah Arbitration Act, see Utah Code §§ 78B-11-101 to -131 (2008). It is entirely unclear 
from Mr. Bryner's argument what harm he claims to have suffered as a result of the trial 
court's decision. In the absence of any information identifying the alleged prejudice to 
Mr. Bryner, even assuming that the trial court erred, Mr. Bryner's appeal should be 
rejected. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN REJECTING 
PORTIONS OF THE PARTIES5 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
The trial court properly recognized that paramount to any decision made in this 
custody dispute, and superseding any effort of the parties to settle the case, is the best 
interest of the children. Thus, the trial court acted within its substantial discretion in 
rejecting certain of the agreed upon settlement terms presented to the court by the parties. 
As the trial court explicitly recognized, Utah law has long held that "a stipulation [or 
settlement] pertaining to matters of divorce, custody and property rights therein, though 
advisory on the court . . . is not necessarily binding on the cour t . . . . It is only a 
recommendation to be adhered to if the court believes it to be fair and reasonable." Klein 
v. Klein, 544 P.2d 472, 476 (Utah 1975); see also Jensen v. Jensen, 2008 UT App 392, t 
23, 197 P.3d 117 (stating "in accordance with the equitable powers of trial courts in 
divorce actions, trial courts should not be prevented 'from doing that which justice and 
equity require for the interest and welfare of the parties involved'" (quoting Reese v. 
Reese, 1999 UT 75,%25, 984 P.2d 987). '"[T]he law was intended to give courts [and 
courts alone] power to disregard the stipulations or agreements of the parties in the first 
instance and enter judgment... and thereafter modify such judgments, when change of 
circumstances justifies it, regardless of the attempts of the parties to control the matter by 
11 
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contract."' Diener v. Diener, 2004 UT App 314, \ 5, 98 P.3d 1178 (quoting Naylor v. 
Naylor, 700 P.2d 707, 709-10 (Utah 1985)). In other words, Utah law precludes any 
effort of the parties to divest the trial court of its jurisdiction and authority to render or 
modify judgments in any divorce or custody action. See Sill v. Sill, 2007 UT App 173, ffl[ 
13-14, 164P.3d 173. 
In the instant case, in the midst of a protracted and hotly litigated custody dispute, 
the parties engaged in settlement discussions seeking to agree upon stipulated terms that 
would resolve the matter.3 (R. 3790.) The parties failed to contemporaneously 
memorialize the agreement that they entered into at that time, attempting instead to allow 
the guardian ad litem to draft the terms. (R. 3790-3794.) Thus, both parties submitted 
competing versions of the agreement to the trial court, which they respectively then 
sought to enforce. (R. 3790.) The competing submissions demonstrated that the parties 
had settled several material aspects of their dispute, (R. 3791-93), including agreeing to 
submit all future disputes that did not involve the children to binding arbitration. (R. 
3795.) However, because the parties' arbitration agreement was not absolutely clear, the 
court ensured that the parties would not attempt to subject custody, parent-time, and 
support issues to arbitration, concluding that it is against Utah public policy for the court 
to allow parties to divest the court of jurisdiction over child custody matters. The court's 
decision is supported by Utah law. 
3
 The record is devoid of any citation to the parties' purported settlement discussions; however, it 
is undisputed that the parties engaged in an effort to reach an accord on or about November 10, 
2005, which later was the subject of additional discussions in December 2005, 
12 
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First, it is beyond dispute that a trial court overseeing a custody dispute is not 
bound by the stipulations of the parties or the terms that the parties purport to adopt in 
settlement, but rather, the court is authorized to accept only those terms that it believes to 
be in the best interest of the parties involved, and to reject those terms that do not meet 
that criteria. Jensen, 2008 UT App 392, Tf 23. Second, as pointed out by Mr. Bryner in 
his Hearing Brief, "12 states have found that parents cannot agree to binding arbitration in 
matters of child custody and support, and none otherwise." (R. 2732.); see, e.g., Martin v. 
Martin, 734 So. 2d 1133,1136 (Fla. Ct. App. 1999) (refusing to allow binding mediation 
on visitation issues); Pulfer v. Pulfer, 673 N.E.2d 656, (Oh. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that 
"matters of child custody may only be decided by the trial court and are not subject to 
arbitration despite any agreement entered into by the parties"). Those states that do 
permit some form of arbitration do so only with the caveat that custody decisions made by 
an arbitrator are subject to de novo court review. See, e.g., In re Marriage ofPopack, 998 
P.2d 464, 468-69 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000) (discussing Section 14-10-128.5, C.R.S. 1999, 
which permits parties to a divorce or custody action the power to agree to the appointment 
of an arbitrator to resolve disputes, but reserves to the trial court the right to review the 
arbitrator's decisions); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-66 (allowing for the use of arbitration in 
divorce cases, but expressly reserving issues related to child support, visitation, and 
custody for the trial court). And although Utah law is silent on the issue of arbitration in 
this context, Sill v. Sill focuses the discussion and highlights the propriety of the trial 
court's decision. See 2007 UT App 173. In Sill, the parties "agreed to end their eighteen-
year marriage [and they] entered into settlement negotiations." Id. at H 3. Through this 
13 
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agreement, the parties settled support issues, and agreed that "[t]he provisions of th[e] 
[AJgreement shall be non-modifiable as shall the Decree of Divorce which implements 
it." Id. (alterations in original). The husband later sought to modify the support 
provisions of the agreement, and the trial court concluded that the husband was barred 
from taking such an action by the plain language of his agreement. Id. at fflf 5-6. On 
appeal, this court reversed the trial court's decision after determining that the Legislature 
had vested trial courts with "continuing jurisdiction" over support issues in the context of 
a divorce proceeding, and no action by the parties was sufficient to divest the trial court of 
that continuing jurisdiction. Id. at ^ 9-13. Applying the Sill analysis to the instant case 
results in an identical conclusion here. 
Specifically, the parties presented the court with the terms of a settlement 
agreement through which they agreed to submit all future disputes to binding arbitration, 
which would remove the matter from the court's purview. However, Utah Code section 
30-3-5(3) (2008) clearly sets forth that trial courts have "continuing jurisdiction to make 
subsequent changes or new orders for the custody of the children and their support, 
maintenance, health, and dental care." Had the trial court accepted the parties' arbitration 
provision, the court would have, in essence, allowed the parties to divest it of jurisdiction 
over an issue that the Legislature has mandated to be under the ongoing and continuous 
jurisdiction of the trial court. 
Consequently, the trial court acted well within its discretion in adopting certain 
portions of the parties' stipulated settlement agreement, and in rejecting others, and as a 
result, Mr. Bryner's argument should be rejected. 
14 
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CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, because Mr. Bryner failed to satisfy several requirements of Rule 24 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, failed to articulate any prejudice that will inure 
to him as a result of the trial court's decision, and because the trial court acted well within 
its discretion in rejecting certain terms of the parties' settlement agreement, this Court 
should reject Mr. Bryner's appeal and affirm the trial court's decision. 
DATED this ^ day of April, 2009. 
DURHA^fJON^S & PlNEGAR, P.C. 
B y : / V ^ > 
Thomas J. Burns 
Attorney for Appellee/Respondent 
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